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The Role of the Family in Deceased Organ 
Procurement: A Guide for Clinicians and 
Policymakers
Janet Delgado, PhD, MA, RN,1,2,3,4 Alberto Molina-Pérez, PhD,3,5 David Shaw, MML, MA, MSc, PGCE,3,6,7 
and David Rodríguez-Arias, PhD3,5
INTRODUCTION
Families in different jurisdictions can play very different 
roles in organ procurement after death, and their views often 
determine whether the organs are eventually obtained for 
transplantation. In fact, their objection to organ procure-
ment is a leading cause of organs not being procured in many 
countries.1 Transplant coordinators and organ procurement 
teams have to decide whether, when, and the extent to which 
family members of deceased donors are involved in the 
decision-making process related to organ procurement. That 
decision depends on legal, medical, and organizational con-
siderations, and has different ethical implications. In most 
countries, families are allowed and expected to make deci-
sions, which may or may not accord with the wishes of the 
deceased,2 whereas in other countries, they may be informed 
but are not involved in the decision. The former are often 
called “soft” systems, while the latter are known as “hard” 
systems.3,4 However, these labels do not capture the many 
roles relatives can play in diverse situations in each coun-
try, or account for the differences between countries. For 
instance, one soft system may rely on the family to decide 
only when the preferences of the deceased are unknown, but 
another soft system may also let the family decide against the 
expressed preferences of the deceased.
Two factors determine the role relatives actually play in 
organ procurement: the preferences of the deceased and 
the model of consent in place. On the one hand, depending 
on the existence or absence of expressed preferences by the 
Review
Abstract: Families play an essential role in deceased organ procurement. As the person cannot directly communicate his 
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a systematic description and analysis of the different roles the family can play, and actions the family can take, in the organ 
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deceased—and the content of such preferences—relatives 
can authorize or refuse organ procurement either: (a) on 
behalf of the deceased, according to what they believe the 
patient would have wished, (b) because of their own values, 
regardless of what the deceased might have wished, had a 
wish been expressed, or even (c) against the explicit wishes 
of the deceased, whether in favor or against donation.
On the other hand, the family’s role and decision-making 
capacity depend on the model of consent. Under an opt-in 
or “explicit consent” system, organs cannot be removed 
unless the person had expressly consented to such removal 
before death, while under an opt-out or “presumed con-
sent” system, organs can be removed by default unless the 
person had expressed an opposition.5 Actually, both sys-
tems involve presumptions: opt-in systems presume that 
consent is not given, and their default policy is to do noth-
ing, while opt-out systems presume that consent is given, 
and their default policy is to remove the organs.6 In theory, 
the application of these default policies is quite straight-
forward. In reality, however, relatives’ involvement adds 
complexity to the implementation of both opt-in and opt-
out. When the deceased had neither consented nor clearly 
expressed opposition to organ removal, which is common 
in both opt-in and opt-out jurisdictions, families’ views 
become particularly decisive in clinical practice, even if it 
is not a legally enshrined right. In opt-in systems, relatives 
can override the default—not to procure the organs—by 
authorizing organ procurement, whereas in opt-out sys-
tems, relatives can override the default—to procure the 
organs—by opposing organ procurement. In some juris-
dictions, their authority in the decision can even prevail 
over the deceased’s explicit wish to donate.
Many articles have analyzed the role of the family in 
several countries,2,7-17 but these accounts are often incom-
plete or too imprecise to determine exactly what relatives 
are allowed to do in a given jurisdiction, in each of the situ-
ations described. For instance, Rosenblum et al2 published 
in 2012 a detailed analysis on the authority of next of kin 
in deceased organ donation, which included 54 opt-in 
and opt-out nations. They found that relatives are almost 
always involved in the organ procurement process, even if 
the deceased’s wishes to donate are documented. However, 
their classification does not distinguish what exact role 
families are allowed to play, within a given nation, under 
3 possible scenarios: (1) when the deceased had expressed 
consent; (2) when the deceased had expressed refusal; and 
(3) when the deceased had not expressed any preference.
Within a given country, the role families are stipulated to 
play in the law may differ from the role they actually play in 
practice. However, most descriptive accounts on the role of 
families in organ procurement fail to make this distinction.
To cast more light on this topic, we interviewed 53 
experts from 18 countries attending the 2016 annual 
meeting of the ESOT-ELPAT (European Society for Organ 
Transplantation–Ethical Legal and Psychosocial Aspects 
of Transplantation) with a series of questions about the 
role families play in their country (Table S1, Figure S1, 
SDC, http://links.lww.com/TP/B681). A salient outcome 
of that preliminary exploration was that the majority of 
these experts reported differences between the content of 
the law and the actual practice in their country regarding 
the role families play in organ procurement. Later, in 2017, 
we emailed government officials and legal experts all over 
Europe with similar questions, obtaining 22 responses 
(Table S2, SDC, http://links.lww.com/TP/B681). On both 
occasions, the answers we received were strikingly incon-
sistent or ambiguous. Such ambiguity can be partially 
explained by discrepancies between local regulations and 
actual practices, but we also noticed that some common 
terms, such as “presumed consent,” “family consent,” and 
“family veto” are being used with different meanings. For 
more detail, the methodology and results of both explora-
tory surveys are explained in the Supplemental File (SDC, 
http://links.lww.com/TP/B681).
We take these exploratory findings as a symptom of the 
complexity of policy and as a sign that conceptual clarity 
is needed regarding the role families play in organ procure-
ment. These reasons led us to propose a simplified system-
atic model of organ procurement policies.
In this article, we propose a theoretical framework of all 
possible roles that relatives can play in any given country, 
either according to the law or in clinical practice. This frame-
work aims to be simple yet complete. It encompasses the 2 
variables that determine the role relatives can play: the pref-
erences of the deceased (nonexpressed preference, consent, 
refusal) and the model of consent (opt-in, opt-out). First, we 
propose a series of definitions to explain different actions in 
relation to the consent models. Next, we provide a reasoned 
list of actions that relatives can possibly take to intervene 
in the organ procurement decision-making process. Then, 
we propose a classification of the different roles families can 
play according to the 2 variables (Table 1). Finally, we pre-
sent several examples of application of our classification.
Our classification does not take into account family deci-
sions that have no impact on the process of organ procure-
ment, for instance, cases where relatives can object to organ 
procurement, but without implying stopping the removal of 
organs. We only consider situations in which family’s deci-
sions have consequences in the organ procurement process.
The goal of this proposal is to gain a more comprehen-
sive and granular understanding of the consent system for 
organ donation as a whole and the role families play. The 
scope of this model is broad, as it aims to account for the 
majority, if not all, of the world’s consent systems.
DEFINITIONS
 Opt-in (also known as explicit consent system). Under an 
opt-in system, organs may be removed from a deceased per-
son if the person had expressly consented to such removal 
during his or her lifetime, either verbally or, depending 
on domestic law, such consent may also be recorded on a 
donor card, driver’s license or identity card, medical record, 
or a donor registry.5
 Opt-out (also known as presumed consent). Under an opt-
out system, organs may be removed from a deceased per-
son for transplantation unless the person had expressed his 
or her opposition before death.5
 Mandatory choice (or mandated choice). Under a man-
datory choice system, individuals are required by law to 
express their preferences regarding organ procurement. 
This procedure can be made while they execute a state-
regulated task, such as registering for a driver’s license, 
applying for a renewal of their identity card, or filing 
income tax forms. Since organs cannot be removed unless 
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the person had expressly consented to such removal, this 
system works similar to an opt-in system.
 Organ procurement refers to the operation of organ 
removal for transplantation regardless of whether it exists 
a consent given by the deceased person or an authorization 
by the next of kin.
 Organ donation refers to the organ procurement expressly 
consented by the deceased. We suggest using the term 
“donation”when the person had granted permission to the 
removal of his or her organs, and “procurement”to both 
consented and not consented organ removal.
 Consent refers to the explicit permission granted by the 
deceased to the removal of his or her own organs. We con-
sider that the lack of an explicit refusal in opt-out countries 
is not equivalent to the deceased’s consent. Hence, we sug-
gest restricting the use of the term “consent”to the decision 
explicitly made by the deceased. Although some authors and 
regulations use the expression “family consent,”we suggest 
replacing it with “family authorization”to avoid confusion.
 Refusal refers to an explicit objection expressed or 
recorded by the deceased person. We suggest to use the 
term “refusal”when the person had objected to the removal 
of his or her own organs, and “opposition”or “overrule”to 
refer to different types of family objection to organ pro-
curement (see below).
 Family refers to relatives, next of kin, and also friends of 
the deceased. We recognize that the family is not one mono-
lithic unit and is made up of different people who may have 
different attitudes to and knowledge of both the patient’s 
donation preferences and organ procurement in general.18 
Furthermore, there can be internal disagreements within a 
family about what the deceased would have wanted, and 
whether to obey his or her wishes. In some countries, such as 
the United Kingdom and Chile, the decision-making person 
within the family is determined by law according to a hier-
archy of relatives. For the sake of clarity we use the word 
“family”throughout to refer to whoever is involved in dis-
cussing organ procurement with healthcare professionals.
RELATIVES’ POSSIBLE ACTIONS IN ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT PROCESS
There are 3 main ways in which the family can intervene 
in a given consent system, when they are allowed to. First, 
by participating in obtaining, recording, and testifying to 
the deceased’s preferences. Second, by reversing the system’s 
default when the deceased did not express any preferences. 
Third, by overruling the deceased’s explicit preferences.
Each of these intervention types can be further specified 
into different actions:
 1. The family can obtain and record the deceased’s most 
recent expressions of consent or refusal, and communicate 
them to the medical team.
	a.	Relatives can inform about the deceased’s preferences. 
When the medical team does not know if the deceased 
wished to become a donor, they may ask relatives to 
provide this information.




record	 and	 communicate	 whether	 the	 person	 had	 more	
recently	changed	his	or	her	mind.
 2. The family can be allowed to reverse the default course of 
action defined by the consent system when the deceased 
had expressed no preferences. The family can either ground 
their decision in their own views or in what they speculate 
the deceased may have wished.
a.	Relatives	 can	 authorize	 procurement	 when	 the	 default	
is	not	to	procure	the	organs	in	the	absence	of	a	consent	
expressed	by	the	deceased	person.
b.	Relatives	 can	 oppose	 procurement	 when	 the	 default	 is	
to	proceed	with	organ	procurement	in	the	absence	of	an	
objection	expressed	by	the	deceased	person.
 3. The family can be allowed to decide whether organ pro-
curement should take place, despite and against the deci-
sion taken by the deceased person while alive to consent or 
to refuse donation.
a.	Relatives	can	overrule	a	consent.	When	the	deceased	had	
expressed	 the	 explicit	 wish	 to	 become	 an	 organ	 donor	






Levels of involvement of the family
Deceased 
wishes
Role of the family
Model No role (L0) Witness (L1) Surrogate (L2) Full decisional authority (L3)
Unknown Opt-out – Can inform about the deceased’s 
wishes
Can oppose organ procurement Can oppose organ procurement
Opt-in – Can inform about the deceased’s 
wishes
Can authorize organ procurement Can authorize organ 
procurement
Consent Opt-in, opt-out – Can update the deceased’s wishes Can update the deceased’s wishes Can overrule consent
Refusal Opt-in, opt-out – Can update the deceased’s wishes Can update the deceased’s wishes Can overrule refusala
Levels are ordered by columns in increasing order from no role at all (L0) to full decisional authority (L3). Each level specifies what relatives can do under 3 different situations ordered by rows: when 
the organ procurement team does not know the wishes of the deceased (Unknown), when they know that the deceased had expressed a wish to become a donor (Consent), and when they know that 
the deceased had objected to become a donor (Refusal). The table also takes into account the model of consent (opt-in or opt-out), although this variable has an effect on the role of the family only 
when the wishes of the deceased are unknown.
aThis option is theoretically possible, but it is very unlikely that any consent system would allow the family to override a refusal, for it is contrary to current international laws and guidelines. However, 
families in, for example, the UK are permitted to provide evidence of consent that supersedes a recorded refusal, according to Human Tissue Authority guidelines. (Code of practice 10—Human 
Transplantation (Wales) Act). This would not technically be an overrule (but rather an update), although it might be regarded as one.
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the	family	can	nevertheless	allow	or	authorize	the	medi-
cal	team	to	proceed	with	organ	removal.
These generic actions clarify how each consent sys-
tem ought to be interpreted and/or how they are actually 
implemented.
 1.a. Relatives can inform about the deceased’s preferences under 
2 circumstances: if there is no record whatsoever on the 
deceased’s preferences, and if there is no valid record. It 
is the system of consent which defines which records are 
deemed valid (ie, official registries, living wills), as well as 
which types of information from the family may be taken 
into account: documents written by the deceased, a declara-
tion signed by family members, a mere oral declaration, etc.
1.b. Relatives can update the deceased’s preferences when there 
is a valid record known to the medical team. The fam-
ily can confirm the already expressed preference by the 
deceased or indicate a change of opinion, if the case arises.
2.a. Relatives can authorize procurement. We suggest restrict-
ing the use of the term “authorization”to those situations 
where the deceased did not express any preference and 
where the default is not to procure the organs (opt-in 
system). In addition, when a person is not capable or not 
allowed to make a decision on organ donation (eg, chil-
dren, mentally disabled), the family can act as surrogate 
decision-maker. Also, in some countries, people can express 
the wish that, after death, their family or a designated per-
son makes the decision on their behalf. Under a prototypi-
cal opt-in system, organs cannot be procured without the 
deceased’s expressed consent to donate. However, most 
opt-in countries allow relatives to nevertheless authorize 
the removal of organs (Table 2). In contrast, under a pro-
totypical opt-out system, in the absence of the deceased’s 
objection, organs can be automatically procured. In this 
case, since procurement is already the default course of 
action, no further action should theoretically be needed 
from the next of kin. We therefore consider that next-of-
kin’s authorization is only required in opt-in systems, that 
is, where the procurement would not proceed otherwise. 
However, it seems that most opt-out countries require nev-
ertheless the next-of-kin’s approval (Table 2).2
2.b. Relatives can oppose procurement. We suggest restricting 
the use of the term “opposition”to those situations where 
the deceased did not express any preference and where 
procurement is the default (opt-out system). As said pre-
viously, under prototypical opt-out and opt-in systems, in 
the absence of expressed preferences from the deceased 
regarding donation, the course of action is determined 
by the default, regardless of the family. We therefore con-
sider that next-of-kin’s authority to oppose the procure-
ment process can only be granted in opt-out systems, that 
is, where the procurement would proceed otherwise.
3.a. Relatives can overrule consent. This action is also 
referred to as veto. We suggest using the expression 
“overruled consent”(or “veto”) in situations where the 
family’s opposition stops organ procurement, contrary to 
the wishes of the deceased.
3.b. Relatives can overrule refusal. This is the permission 
granted by relatives to proceed with organ procurement 
against the will of the deceased. These cases may either be 
very exceptional or underreported because of potential 
controversy.
FAMILY’S ROLE AND LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT
We distinguish 4 levels of family involvement (Table 1). 
Each level includes several actions that relatives can be 
allowed to do. Importantly, these levels are incremental, 
such that higher levels include all potential actions allowed 
under lower ones, except the Level 0.
 L0: Family has no role
 Level 0 (L0) describes situations where the family is not 
given the opportunity to be involved in the decision-
making process. Relatives are not consulted and play no 
role at all, although they might be kept informed about 
what is going to be done with the organs.
 L1: Family acts as mere witness
 Level 1 (L1) describes situations where the family is 
just expected or allowed to communicate the witnessed 
wishes of the deceased, nothing more. Doctors may or 
may not know the preferences of the deceased. In the first 
case, the next of kin may still be approached to update 
the record to seek whether the person had changed his 
or her mind before death. In the second case, the family 
is asked to provide that information, if they have it. In 
either case, the family has no decisional capacity. It is the 
medical team who decides.
 L2: Family acts as surrogate
 Level 2 (L2) reflects greater implication of the family 
in the decision-making process. In addition to acting 
as witness of the deceased’s wishes, if any, the fam-
ily can reverse the default course of action defined by 
the consent system if no wishes have been expressed. 
In opt-out countries, they can oppose organ removal, 
whereas in opt-in countries, they can authorize it. 
The family can decide either according to what they 
believe the deceased can have wished or according to 
their own views. Whenever the deceased had expressed 
their preferences during their lifetime, either in favor 
or against donation, the family has not such decisional 
capacity.
 L3: Family has full decisional authority
 Level 3 (L3) describes the highest degree of decisional 
capacity relatives can have in the organ procure-
ment decision-making process. As in L2, the family is 
consulted to make a decision if the preferences of the 
deceased are unknown to the medical team, and the 
family cannot provide any information. The distinction 
from L2 is that the family can also overrule the consent 
or refusal expressed by the deceased. However, it is very 
unlikely that any consent system would allow the family 
to override a refusal, for it is contrary to current inter-
national laws and guidelines.
EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION
Table 1 is intended to capture the role of relatives in 
any given country and to enable comparisons between 
several jurisdictions. If differences exist between law 
and practice, our table facilitates this distinction, as a 
national regulation may fulfill the description of one level 
but be applied more loosely or more rigidly and there-
fore qualify for a different level. Here are 3 examples: 
The Spanish opt-out law can be classified as L1 (wit-
ness),46 because next of kin can solely inform or update 
doctors regarding the wishes of the deceased. However, 
in practice, a written authorization from the family is 
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always required to proceed with organ procurement.46 
Some authors interpret this situation as Spanish families 
having a de facto power to overrule the consent of the 
deceased.55 If this is the case, although Spain’s legal sys-
tem can be classified as L1 (witness), it might be operat-
ing in practice as L3 (full decisional authority). The law 
in Singapore—another opt-out system—can be classified 
as L1 (witness), but some accounts suggest that it actually 
operates as L2 (surrogate), because families can oppose 
organ procurement when the deceased’s preferences are 
unknown.26 All Canadian provinces have an opt-in legis-
lation where families can act as surrogate (L2), but they 
seemingly operate as if families actually had full deci-
sional authority (L3).31
The countries analyzed in Rosenblum et al2 can be clas-
sified as follows under our taxonomy according to the 
information provided by the authors. However, we could 
not determine whether their classification refers to the 
legal or the de facto role families play in organ procure-
ment. In addition, it must be noted that some the following 
countries may have changed their legislation and/or prac-
tice since the publication of Rosenblum’s article in 2012 
(such as France, the Netherlands, and Wales).
 • Surrogate: (opt-in) the Netherlands, Romania, United 
Kingdom, and most of the United States; (opt-out) Belgium, 
Finland, Singapore, and Sweden.
 • Full decisional authority: (opt-in) Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Cuba, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, Venezuela; (opt-
out) Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey.
In Table  2, we provide a classification of countries 
according to the level of involvement families have, both 
according to the local regulations and in practice, in organ 
procurement decision-making. Since Table 2 is used as an 
illustration of our framework’s applicability and useful-
ness, we decided to include a country when there was at 
least one reliable source in the literature describing that 
country’s practices, although no hard data were provided 
about their prevalence. Whenever described practices were 
different from the law, single cases or marginal accounts 
were not taken into consideration.
Overall, it appears that legislation tends to be stricter 
than actual clinical practice, perhaps because clinicians do 
not wish to alienate families.
LIMITATIONS
Our proposed theoretical framework comprehensively 
maps the different consent systems and potential family 
roles, but it has some limitations. For instance, it does not 
reflect the fact that in many hospitals (in both opt-in and 
opt-out countries), an authorization from the family is 
commonly required even if the patient had recorded his 
or her consent on the donor register. If the deceased’s pref-
erences prevail over the family’s, then it may be consid-
ered an inconsistency of current organ donation systems. 
However, if the consent of the deceased and the authoriza-
tion of the family are both required, then this may be a new 
“double consent” system not described in the literature.
Our framework does not reflect either some systems that 
are possible in theory but atypical or unusual in reality. 
For instance, Singapore’s presumed consent law initially 
excluded Muslims, who were automatically considered 
objectors as a group, even though they could still opt-in 
as individuals—the law was eventually amended in 2007 
to remove the exemption.55 We cannot rule out that other 
TABLE 2.
Classification of countries according to the level of involvement of families, either in the law or in practice
Level 0 1 2 3































aWe refer to the Act of 24 May 1996, concerning rules concerning the provision of organs (Law on organ donation).53
bNot including Wales since December 2015 because the law changed to an opt-out system.54
cAccording to one study, only 20% of Organ Procurement Organizations in the United States may allow families to overrule the deceased’s consent.52
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jurisdictions may currently or in the future include provi-
sions to allow community consent or refusal (beside that 
from the individual and the family), similar to the situation 
of consent for research with indigenous communities.56
Another area where our model cannot entirely reflect 
reality concerns the honesty of family members. Though 
data on this phenomenon are scarce, it is possible that fam-
ilies might claim to be updating regarding the deceased’s 
preferences, when they are actually misrepresenting what 
they wanted to prevent (or, possibly, enable) organ pro-
curement. For the purposes of our article, we assume that 
families are being honest—as clinicians must also do.
CONCLUSIONS
The systematic description, analysis, and taxonomy 
we have developed in this article offer a clarification of 
the role of the family in the organ procurement decision-
making process. To have a clear classification of the differ-
ent kinds of actions available to relatives when discussing 
and deciding about the deceased’s organ procurement is 
critical in implementing new policies. National organ 
procurement organizations ought to clarify to the public 
what procedure they are following and the precise level 
of involvement of the family. This article provides a fea-
sible and useful model to categorize the role of families 
in most scenarios. The aim of this taxonomy is informa-
tive: we seek to clarify what are the different levels of fam-
ily’s involvement. It contributes substantial content to the 
theoretical and practical spheres, and it can be helpful for 
policymakers, health professionals, scholars, and citizens. 
Our clarification provides conceptual and methodological 
guidance for further theoretical or empirical studies on the 
role of the family in organ procurement. The taxonomy 
does not offer recommendations about the optimal level of 
participation of the family in the decision-making process. 
We consider it as a necessary first step for the discussion of 
ethical and legal problems regarding family’s involvement 
in organ procurement. Further studies addressing ethical 
and legal aspects may use this taxonomy to understand 
and critically assess different scenarios, and the ethical 
repercussions of each level of family involvement.
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